GPT-4 Doesn’t Know It’s Wrong: An Analysis of Iterative Prompting for Reasoning Problems
Kaya Stechly ††thanks: Arizona State University, Tempe. Matthew Marquez* Subbarao Kambhampati*
Abstract
There has been considerable divergence of opinion on the reasoning abilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). While the initial optimism that reasoning might emerge automatically with scale has been tempered thanks to a slew of counterexamples–ranging from multiplication to simple planning, there is still the wide spread belief that LLMs can self-critique and improve their own solutions in an iterative fashion. This belief seemingly rests on the assumption that verification of correctness should be easier than generation–a rather classical argument from computational complexity, that should be irrelevant to LLMs to the extent what they are doing is approximate retrieval. In this paper, we set out to systematically investigate the effectiveness of iterative prompting of LLMs in the context of Graph Coloring, a canonical NP-complete reasoning problem that is related to propositional satisfiability as well as practical problems like scheduling and allocation. We present a principled empirical study of the performance of GPT4 in solving graph coloring instances or verifying the correctness of candidate colorings–both in direct and iterative modes. In iterative modes, we experiment both
原文 arXiv:2310.12397;中英对照 + 大白话阅读 https://aha.fim.ai/paper/2310.12397v1