Poisoning Web-Scale Training Datasets is Practical
Nicholas Carlini1 Matthew Jagielski1 Christopher A. Choquette-Choo1 Daniel Paleka2 Will Pearce3 Hyrum Anderson4 Andreas Terzis1 Kurt Thomas5 Florian Tramèr2 1Google DeepMind 2ETH Zurich 3NVIDIA 4Robust Intelligence 5Google
Abstract
Deep learning models are often trained on distributed, web-scale datasets crawled from the internet. In this paper, we introduce two new dataset poisoning attacks that intentionally introduce malicious examples to a model’s performance. Our attacks are immediately practical and could, today, poison $10{}$ popular datasets. Our first attack, split-view poisoning, exploits the mutable nature of internet content to ensure a dataset annotator’s initial view of the dataset differs from the view downloaded by subsequent clients. By exploiting specific invalid trust assumptions, we show how we could have poisoned $0.01\%$ of the LAION-400M or COYO-700M datasets for just $60 USD. Our second attack, frontrunning poisoning, targets web-scale datasets that periodically snapshot crowd-sourced content—such as Wikipedia—where an attacker only needs a time-limited window to inject malicious examples. In light of both attacks, we notify the maintainers of each affected dataset and recommended several low-overhead defenses.
原文 arXiv:2302.10149;中英对照 + 大白话阅读 https://aha.fim.ai/paper/2302.10149v2